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Abstract
This article is one of ten reviews selected from the
Annual Update in Intensive Care and Emergency
Medicine 2019. Other selected articles can be found
online at https://www.biomedcentral.com/collections/
annualupdate2019. Further information about the
Annual Update in Intensive Care and Emergency
Medicine is available from http://www.springer.com/
series/8901.
Introduction
Over a decade ago, researchers published the first case
of a patient who had been clinically unresponsive for
years after traumatic brain injury (TBI) and demon-
strated command following using motor imagery para-
digms visualized by functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) [1]. The term “cognitive motor dissoci-
ation” is gaining popularity to describe this scenario of
an inability to behaviorally express preserved cognitive
processes [2]. Alternative labels are covert or hidden
consciousness and functional locked-in syndrome [3]
(see Table 1). A flurry of subsequent studies using fMRI
and functional electroencephalogram (fEEG) approaches
explored the boundaries of human consciousness follow-
ing brain injury. This growing body of knowledge is now
being discussed in the lay press and is starting to affect
clinical medicine, challenging the classical taxonomy of
disorders of consciousness ([4] see Table 1). Until very
recently, researchers have focused their attention on pa-
tients suffering from chronic disorders of consciousness
and have generated estimates of cognitive motor dissoci-
ation of around 15% using convenience samples of these
patients [5]. Detection of cognitive motor dissociation in
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the acute phase of brain injury may have prognostic sig-
nificance as these patients are more likely to also recover
behavioral command following and have better
long-term functional outcomes.
Few data exist for the early phase after brain injury,
such as in the intensive care unit (ICU) setting, when
decisions regarding withdrawal of care are more fre-
quently made and prognostic information is needed. De-
tection of cognitive motor dissociation in the acute
setting will face unique challenges including logistics,
safety and ethical considerations but also offer great op-
portunities to affect management. Even though the ex-
ploration of consciousness in the acutely brain injured
patient is in its infancy, emerging data demonstrating
cognitive motor dissociation in patients who are clinic-
ally unresponsive raise a number of questions. These
questions can be organized around three overarching
themes: technical, medical and ethical aspects.
Technical considerations
How can we probe consciousness in unresponsive
patients?
Clinical exam
Intensivists are used to probing the consciousness of
brain injured patients during rounds using standard
neurological examination techniques. The general
principle of the clinical approach for assessment of con-
sciousness is to probe behavior that is non-reflexive and
can be considered as intentional. The most common
items assessed are reactivity to sound and touch and, if
necessary, responsiveness to nociceptive stimuli: is the
patient able to open his/her eyes, is he/she attentive or
eventually tracking? Clinicians also use simple verbal
commands such as “stick out your tongue” and “show
me two fingers”. These commands are often combined
with a visual cue of the expected response also known as
‘mimicking’. This is employed for patients to minimize
the impact of acoustic (i.e., deafness) or speech
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perception problems (i.e., aphasia). This clinical assess-
ment requires good neurological examination skills to
minimize the risk of misinterpretation (e.g., motor re-
sponses as part of reflexive responses to pain are
thought to be intentional). However, even when per-
formed by experienced clinicians, non-standardized
neurological examinations have a high error rate (esti-
mated to be as high as 40% in the chronic setting [6]).
As a part of the neurological exam, many clinicians
quantify impairment of consciousness using the Glasgow
Coma Scale (GCS). Even though this scale was originally
developed to triage acute neurosurgical interventions for
TBI patients and to assist prognostication, it may have
some utility when applied for this purpose. However, the
GCS is a very crude assessment of consciousness, espe-
cially when applied to tracheally intubated patients. The
Full Outline of Unresponsiveness (FOUR) score may
offer an alternative and has been rigorously validated [7].
Since the FOUR does not require verbal responses, it is
more applicable for tracheally intubated patients. Prob-
ing visual tracking, it also allows a better detection of
patients in minimally conscious and locked-in states
(Table 2). Currently, the most widely accepted clinical
scale designed for assessment of consciousness is the
Coma Recovery Scale-Revised (CRS-R) [8]. This com-
prehensive scale is the gold standard in the field of con-
sciousness research. CRS-R scoring ranges from 0 to 23
according to the presence or the absence of behavioral
Table 1 Definitions of common states of consciousness
Definition Other terminologies similar or very close
Behaviorally defined states
Coma [4] State of unresponsiveness in which the patient lies with eyes
closed and cannot be aroused to respond appropriately to
stimuli even with vigorous stimulation (no eye opening or
adapted motor response even to painful stimuli).
Coma-1a or 1ba (based on EEG compatibility [1a; e.g., slow
unreactive predominant delta] or not [1b; e.g., reactive
predominant alpha]). Some authors use a Glasgow coma
scale cut-off (e.g., < 8) but this is very misleading since this
can include UWS or even MCS patients in whom the ascend-
ing reticular activating system (ARAS) is likely to be functional
Unresponsive
wakefulness
syndrome (UWS) [9]
State of unresponsiveness in which the patient shows
spontaneous eye opening without any behavioral evidence of
self or environmental awareness
Vegetative state (VS), coma vigil, apallic state, UWS/VS-2a
or2ba (CMS excluded [2a] or not [2b] by functional MRI or
EEG)
Minimally conscious
state (MCS) [8]
State of severely impaired consciousness with minimal but
definite behavioral evidence of self or environmental
awareness Distinction between MCS “minus” and “plus” has
been proposed [3]
• MCS–minus: visual fixation/pursuit or adapted motor reaction
to pain
• MCS-plus: evidence of language processing (e.g., command
following, verbalization...)
Cortically Mediated Statea (CMS, in that case CMS-3b as based
on behavior alone).
Locked-in syndrome
(LIS) [4]
State in which the patient is actually conscious but de-
efferented, resulting in paralysis of all four limbs and the lower
cranial nerves
De-efferented state, Conscious state-4ba
Conscious stateb [4] State of full awareness of the self and one’s relationship to the
environment, evidenced by verbal or non-verbal (e.g., pur-
poseful motor behavior) behavior
Exit-MCS (or EMCS) when the patient emerged from MCS,
Conscious state-4ba
Brain functional imaging defined states (e.g., fMRI, fEEG, fNIRS, fPET, fMEG)
Higher-order cortex
motor dissociation
(HMD) [26]
Comatose, UWS or MCS-minus (clinically defined) patients that
show association cortex responses to language stimuli
CMS-3aa
Cognitive motor
dissociation (CMD)
[2]
Comatosec, UWS or MCS-minus clinically defined patients that
show MRI or electrophysiologic evidence of command
following
Functional locked-in syndrome, Conscious state-4aa
Communicating-
CMD (Com-CMD)
CMD defined patients able to communicate using a brain
computer interface (BCI)
Conscious state-4aa
fMRI functional magnetic resonance imaging, fEEG functional electroencephalography, fNIRS function near-infrared spectroscopy, fPET functional positron emission
tomography, fMEG functional magnetoencephalography
aTerminology recently proposed by Naccache [50] ranging from 1 to 4 and, taking into account both behavioral (“b”) and brain functional imaging (“a”) evidence.
Note that as a consequence, the Cortically Mediated State (CMS) and the Conscious state appear both in the behaviorally and the brain functional imaging
sections of this table
bNote that as there is no consensus definition of consciousness yet, provided here is a pragmatic operational definition that would match the currently most
commonly used definitions. It corresponds to the access consciousness, using the subjective report criterion
cThe original description actually did not include the comatose state but was included here since the absence of eye opening cannot rule out the possibility
of CMD
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responses on a set of hierarchically ordered items testing
auditory, visual, motor, oromotor, communication and
arousal function. State of consciousness is determined
by specific key behaviors (and not the total score)
probed during the CRS-R assessment. For example, vis-
ual pursuit, reproducible movements to command and/
or complex motor behavior scores distinguish minimally
conscious state from the unresponsive wakefulness syn-
drome [9], also called vegetative state (see Table 1).
However, application of the CRS-R in the ICU can be
challenging since assessments of patients may at times
require up to 45 min of examination. Another issue is
that patients can fluctuate so exams need to be repeated
several times before drawing any conclusions. All behav-
ioral scales may incorrectly classify aphasic patients as
unconscious but the FOUR score and CRS-R include as-
sessments using visual cues, which may detect signs of
awareness in aphasic patients.
Assessing biomarkers that correlate with level of
consciousness
The fundamental concept of this approach is based on
using neurophysiologic correlates of brain activity as
surrogates for levels of consciousness. Such markers
Table 2 Approaches to assess consciousness
FDG-PET fluorodeoxyglucose position emission tomography, PCI perturbational complexity index, TMS transcranial magnetic stimulation, EEG
electroencephalography, (f) MRI (functional) magnetic resonance imaging, ICU intensive care unit
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include measures of brain metabolism, blood flow and
electrical activity. These measures are assessed in a rest-
ing condition and correlated with current or future be-
havioral states. Comparisons are made of the obtained
measures in patients appearing unconscious and healthy
volunteers. Brain metabolism evaluated using
18F-fluorodeoxyglucose (FDG) position emission tomog-
raphy (PET)-scans showed that hypometabolism in
frontal and parietal cortices is seen in unresponsive
wakefulness syndrome [10]. More generally, conscious-
ness seems to vanish when brain metabolism drops
below normal activity. Similar approaches have been de-
veloped using MRI arterial spin labelling sequences [11].
EEG can, amongst other approaches, be analyzed by
decomposing it into spectral patterns, and quantifying
complexity and connectivity. Spectral analysis is based
on a Fourier transformation and provides information
on the power distribution within the respective fre-
quency bands (typically in the δ, θ, α, β and γ bands).
Complexity of the EEG can be assessed by entropy mea-
sures (e.g., spectral entropy, K complexity, or permuta-
tion entropy). Functional connectivity between distant
electrodes can be assessed using the spectral dimension
(e.g., the debiased weighed phase lag index [wdPLI]) or
information theoretical approaches (e.g., the weighed
symbolic mutual information [wSMI]) [12, 13]. Similar
methodologies assessing cortical functional connectivity
have been developed using fMRI [14]. Candidate EEG
features can then be used to train on an existing dataset
of patients with known level of consciousness using a
multivariate classifier to evaluate the EEG of a new pa-
tient [15].
Among these techniques, markers derived from resting
state EEG seem to be the most promising in the ICU as
imaging tests cannot be easily repeated and
transport-related risks need to be considered for these
sick patients. One study found a correlation between
these EEG features (associating spectral, complexity and
connectivity measures) and level of consciousness in
ICU patients [16]. It is worth noting that the success of
any multivariate classification approaches not only relies
on the feature’s selection and the quality of the EEG pro-
cessing but also largely on the quality of the labels pro-
vided to the algorithm as a training set. So far, these
labels are usually based on behavioral assessments with
obvious limitations.
Detecting correlates of conscious processing
Another approach to probe consciousness in unrespon-
sive patients derives from neuroscientific and neuro-
psychological studies that have proposed physiological
signatures of conscious processing in response to a given
stimulus. One of these techniques focused on a late
component of the evoked potential called P300 (it
derives its name from the fact that it appears as a posi-
tive voltage around 300 ms following a stimulus). One of
the most studied paradigms using this phenomenon in
consciousness research is called the “Local-Global” para-
digm [17]. Schematically this paradigm consists of deliv-
ering a subject sequences of sounds that embed two
levels of auditory regularity, respectively at a local
(within trial) and at a global (across trials) time scale.
Whereas detection of local regularity can occur without
awareness, detection of global regularity is highly corre-
lated with access consciousness [17] (see [18] for a re-
cent review).
A more recent approach that is at the boundaries be-
tween the two approaches described above (i.e., assessing
biomarkers that correlate with the level of consciousness
as well as detecting correlates of conscious processing it-
self ) consists of measuring the complexity of brain re-
sponses to a direct stimulation of the brain using
transcranial magnetic (TMS) pulses directly delivered to
the parietal cortex. Using a specially designed EEG
measure called perturbational complexity index, it is
possible to estimate one’s level of consciousness with
great accuracy in different settings (i.e., sleep, anesthesia
and following brain injury) [19, 20]. This measure sum-
marizes the complexity of the response as well as the
functional connectivity in its temporal dynamic dimen-
sion. This technique paved the way for alternative inter-
pretations of late evoked brain responses (e.g., the N70)
to sensory stimulations observed during the acquisition
of somatosensory evoked potentials (SSEP). These brain
responses have been associated with prognosis of coma-
tose patients but clinical application has been primarily
limited due to a much larger degree of variability when
compared to early components of evoked potentials (i.e.,
the N20 of the SSEP) [21]. Revisiting the
neuro-correlates of these late components that follow
the classical N20 using new computational measures
that quantify connectivity (e.g., wdPLI, wSMI), complex-
ity measures (e.g., permutation entropy) or the perturba-
tional complexity index may provide innovative
approaches at the bedside in the ICU to quantify mea-
sures that not only correlate with the current state but
with future recovery of consciousness.
Detecting correlates of command following
Measuring physiologic changes to verbal commands al-
lows the investigator to identify the state of cognitive
motor dissociation. This approach has been the first to
reliably demonstrate the existence of covert conscious-
ness in patients that clinically meet the criteria of unre-
sponsive wakefulness syndrome [1]. Using fMRI, it is
possible to detect whether a patient is able to follow a
simple verbal command (e.g., “imagine playing tennis” vs
“imagine visiting your home”) by comparing the elicited
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blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD) imaging signal
changes in an unresponsive appearing patient to those
seen in a group of healthy volunteers. The first large
study suggested that 10% of patients with unresponsive
wakefulness syndrome are able to reliably do this [22], a
state later termed cognitive motor dissociation [2]. Sub-
sequently, the feasibility of using fEEG paradigms to de-
tect cognitive motor dissociation in unresponsive
patients was demonstrated by several teams using a
motor imagery EEG paradigm at the bedside [23–27].
Patients with cognitive motor dissociation should be dis-
tinguished from patients who are able to process lan-
guage stimuli (using EEG or fMRI) but without evidence
of conscious processing (coined high-order cortex motor
dissociation [HMD] [26], see Table 1).
Pitfalls and caveats of these techniques in the ICU
Technical aspects
Limitations of the clinical examination for assessing con-
sciousness have been discussed extensively above. Im-
aging techniques allow spatial assessments of physical
properties of interest (e.g., metabolism, blood flow) but
for the purposes of studying ICU patients with impaired
consciousness also have limitations in the real world.
MRI and PET-scans both require transportation of the
patient to the scanner, which potentially exposes patients
to multiple risks (e.g., inferior monitoring, non-optimal
environment in case of emergency, risk of accidental dis-
lodging of tubes and catheters). To safely acquire MRI
scans, sedation and paralytics may be required. Probing
for correlates of consciousness under sedation is sub-
optimal. PET-scans are less problematic since the tracer
can be administered just before the scan and the imaging
can then be acquired under sedation. However, even for
PET scans, transport will be necessary with all of the
above outlined risks. Logistical challenges created in-
clude the additional personnel required to safely trans-
port patients (e.g., nurse, physician, respiratory
technician, MRI technician).
Among all the available techniques, EEG based ap-
proaches have enormous advantages in the ICU setting.
EEG can be acquired at the bedside within the safe ICU
environment. Associated costs for these tests will de-
pend on local reimbursement and healthcare structures.
Regardless, imaging tests like MRI or PET scans will
likely be much more expensive in most health care sys-
tems when compared to EEG or evoked potentials. Add-
itionally, EEG can be repeated many times per day,
which is a huge advantage as consciousness is not a
static phenomenon but may fluctuate throughout the
day (see discussion about clinical limitations above). As-
sessments before and after interventions, for example,
the administration of a medication, are more easily facil-
itated if repeat testing is easily available. Challenges
unique to EEG assessments include electrical noise,
which is very prevalent in the ICU environment, and ar-
tifacts created by involuntary movements such as myo-
clonus, respiratory artifact, and coughing. Seizures and
other epileptiform patterns are additional major con-
founders to detect clear signatures of consciousness on
the EEG. EEG leads may, in the hectic ICU environment,
be removed to allow emergent head CT scans to be ob-
tained to evaluate neurological changes, and placement
of EEG leads may be limited by surgical wounds or
bandages.
Mental imagery tasks are used both for fMRI and
fEEG and are essentially very similar. These probe com-
mand following mostly to verbal commands and are fun-
damentally extensions of the neurological examination.
Typically, patients are asked to perform (or to imagine)
a motor movement that is thought to elicit a consistent
BOLD or EEG signal change to be detected by fMRI or
EEG, respectively. Major limitations are that patients
need to be able to understand the command (challen-
ging in patients that speak a different language, are deaf
or aphasic), are interested in participating (challenging
in patients with poor attention, abulia, delirium or in
pain), and can keep the command in their working
memory long enough to perform the task and to allow
the classifier to detect the different brain activities (chal-
lenging in patients with advanced dementia). Import-
antly, both with fMRI and fEEG, patients can be
identified that are conscious but for the reasons outlined
above, consciousness cannot be ruled out for any of the
patients that are classified as unconscious.
Confounding factors
Among the major confounding factors for the assess-
ment of consciousness in the ICU setting, the following
take a central role: sedation and delirium. Determining
the exact level of consciousness is usually not a major
concern for the clinician treating deeply sedated patients
(e.g., those receiving treatment of refractory status epi-
lepticus or intracranial hypertension). Medications used
in this context include those used for general anesthesia.
On the other hand, in patients who receive lower doses
of sedation, assessments of consciousness can be very
challenging. However, pharmacodynamics and pharma-
cokinetics are altered in deeply sedated patients in the
ICU receiving prolonged courses of sedatives. Inferring
absence of consciousness from the absence of respon-
siveness may lead to the erroneous assumption of
unconsciousness in sedated patients as recently demon-
strated in a study revealing that conscious experiences
may occur under propofol-induced unresponsiveness [28].
Another caveat is the high prevalence (30%) of delir-
ium in the ICU [29]. Although it is relatively easy to
diagnose the classical form of delirium and to
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demonstrate consciousness (even though in an altered
form), the commonly coined ‘hypoactive delirium’ that
can represent half of the delirium can be more difficult
to identify [30]. Delirious patients usually have attention
deficit that could hamper the focus required for the de-
tection of signature of conscious processing of a stimu-
lus (e.g., the Local-Global paradigm) or the sustained
attempt to follow verbal commands.
What are we detecting exactly?
Applying the above introduced techniques, three differ-
ent kinds of signals as surrogates of covert consciousness
can be detected in an unresponsive ICU patient: (1) a
physiological biomarker that correlates with level of con-
sciousness at the group level (e.g., FDG-PET scan meas-
ure of global brain metabolism or multivariate analysis
of EEG features [perturbational complexity index]); (2) a
correlate of conscious processing of a given stimulus at
the individual level (e.g., the P3b using the Local-Global
paradigm, perturbational complexity index); and (3) ap-
propriate and sustainable brain activities in response to
verbal commands at the individual level (e.g., using the
motor imagery EEG paradigm). We propose that the last
category represents at this point the most direct and
convincing evidence of covert consciousness that has
been termed cognitive motor dissociation. Indeed,
physiologic biomarkers that correlate with consciousness
have been developed on models trained on large datasets
using clinical labels. Consequently, the confidence of
how accurately a given patient is classified using these
approaches mainly relies on the quality of the labels used
in the training set. These labels are derived from clinical
examinations which we know are imprecise. The rele-
vance of neural correlates of conscious processing such
as the P3b are still debated. In addition, evidence of con-
scious processing of simple stimuli does not imply the
existence of conscious processing of more complex men-
tal contents. Following commands revealed by fMRI or
fEEG appears as the strongest evidence since it usually
relies on statistics performed at the patient level (using
for instance machine learning and permutation test).
Medical considerations
Prognostication and medical decision making
Prognostication in the acutely unconscious patient is
one of the most challenging problems that intensivists
face when taking care of brain injured patients. Deter-
mining goals of care is paramount in a setting where
survival can mostly be provided but may not be desirable
if the quality of survival is clearly against the patient’s
pre-stated wishes. Actual and predicted recovery of con-
sciousness are major factors that physicians and families
take into account when deciding about goals of care.
Prognostication is frequently inaccurate but clinicians
usually take into account the clinical examination, struc-
tural neuroimaging, biomarkers and electrophysiological
testing. In addition, they need to consider the dynamic
nature of the brain injury as well as potential confound-
ing factors, such as sedation, metabolic derangement,
and or mental disturbance (e.g., delirium). The premor-
bid condition and age of the patient play a role for most
conditions. Disease specific prognosis markers can help
predict long-term functional outcome (usually 6–12
months) [31] but uncertainty usually remains and clini-
cians should be aware of the risks of ‘flawed reasoning’
given the high degree of complexity that may occur as a
result of cognitive biases [32].
Caution is warranted therefore against any studies that
further add to the degree of complexity in assessing
these patients. However, the existence of cognitive motor
dissociation during the acute stage of brain injury, if
confirmed, will likely dramatically change the assessment
of prognostication of these patients. The recently pub-
lished guidelines by the American Academy of Neur-
ology for the management of patients suffering from
chronic disorders of consciousness may serve as an indi-
cator for what may occur for acutely brain injured pa-
tients. These guidelines underline the possibility of
improvement for unresponsive patients months follow-
ing acute brain injury and, accordingly, urge to replace
the term ‘permanent’ vegetative state by ‘chronic’ vegeta-
tive state (or unresponsive wakefulness syndrome) [6].
The acknowledgement of this high degree of uncertainty
at the subacute stage of acute brain injury, and usually
with fewer data than in the chronic setting, should be
remembered when elaborating a poor prognosis based
on limited data a few days after acute brain injury.
Pain management
Considering that 15–40% [5, 26, 27] of unresponsive pa-
tients might be actually conscious and able to experience
pain without any way to express suffering, caregivers
need to consider pain medications whenever a medical
condition is bound to generate nociceptive inputs. Inva-
sive procedures in unconscious appearing patients
should be performed using the same analgo-sedative
management approach as in an awake, communicative
patients.
Recovery of communication abilities
A common challenge for patients in the ICU is their in-
ability to consistently and effectively communicate their
most fundamental physical needs [33]. Conscious pa-
tients in the ICU commonly suffer from unrecognized
pain, discomfort, feelings of loss of control and insecur-
ity, depersonalization, anxiety, sleep disturbances, fear
and frustration [34]. The primary means of communica-
tion for these patients is the use of non-vocal
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techniques, such as lip reading and gestures; however
these methods are often inadequate for effective com-
munication [35]. In addition, the recent description of
cognitive motor dissociation during the acute phase of
brain injury increases the potential number of patients
in a situation of inefficient communication [26].
Brain-computer interface (BCI) systems have recently
generated interest as a method to facilitate contact with
the ICU patients. BCIs translate the patient’s cerebral
electrical activity, typically recorded by EEG, into com-
puter commands bypassing other body functions (Fig. 1).
Although a variety of BCI systems have been proposed
for rehabilitation purposes [36, 37], the number of BCIs,
assisting with communication of the typical physical and
emotional needs of the critically ill, remains significantly
limited [38, 39].
The main restriction for practical application of BCI
systems in the ICU is lack of reliability due to the con-
siderable number of distractions, possible extinction of
goal-directed thinking, deterioration of patient attention
control, etc. Another specific challenge includes eyelid
apraxia or other visual impairments that preclude the
use of classical visual cues. In addition, owing to ex-
tended bedrest and skin breakdown, and pain medica-
tion, the tactile input channel is also sometimes
impaired. Auditory cues allow only very limited informa-
tion to be transferred, like simple questions or com-
mands. Moreover, many training sessions could be
required to teach patients to use BCI technology which
will be challenging with distracted patients in pain and
evolving medical conditions. Therefore, current BCIs in
the ICU focus on quick and reliable signaling (e.g., ‘yes’/
‘no’ binary signals [38, 39] or steady-state visual evoked
potential (SSVEP) based communication [38, 39]) rather
than spelling of words or sentences.
Despite the limitations, BCI technology has the poten-
tial to significantly increase patient autonomy allowing
more efficient pain management as well as better inter-
action with the external environment (e.g., bed position,
call button, lights, television, etc.). Portable EEG-based
BCI has been used in one study for the detection of con-
sciousness [40]. It uses Pavlovian semantic conditioning
to discriminate between cognitive ‘yes’ and ‘no’ re-
sponses. However, it demonstrated reliable level of per-
formance only for offline classifiers in one out of three
locked-in state patients.
To improve the reliability of BCI systems, utilization
of hybrid BCIs, combining either sequential or simultan-
eous integration of different data sources, has been pro-
posed [41]. In hybrid BCIs, EEG data could be
complemented with other brain as well as non-brain
modalities, such as functional near infrared spectroscopy
(fNIRS), electrooculography (EOG), and electromyog-
raphy (EMG), heart rate, hemodynamic response, etc.
[42]. Due to their advanced reliability, hybrid BCIs could
be especially efficient for ICU application.
Despite the drawbacks of current BCI systems, their
main advantage is the potential for instant data process-
ing. Moreover, computationally efficient methods pro-
posed for robust treatment and adaptive modeling of
complex data streams in real-time [43], allow implemen-
tation of BCIs into a personal computer or even tablet
for easy installation in the ICU. Fast feedback of the
real-time BCI systems simplifies the training process for
patients and enables the medical staff to respond more
rapidly to the time-sensitive needs of the patients.
The proportion of patients with cognitive motor dissoci-
ation who would be able to use a BCI to communicate
(that could be called “communicating cognitive motor dis-
sociation” (Table 1)) remains to be determined. According
to the obstacles described above, we can hypothesize that
only cognitive motor dissociation patients with preserved
high cognition capacities (language, memory, executive
function, etc.) will be able to use a BCI. However, it is
worth noting that these devices would also benefit a larger
disabled patient population, such as lock-in syndrome,
hemiplegic or paraplegic patients.
Ethical considerations
Currently, the majority of brain injured patients who die
in the ICU do so as a direct consequence of withdrawal
of life-sustaining therapies [44]. Lack of consciousness
Fig. 1 Brain-computer interface systems. Brain-computer interface
systems use state-of-the-art machine learning methods to decode
brain activity. A brain-computer interface system is realized using
several components: (1) brain signal activity acquisition:
electroencephalogram (EEG), electrocorticography (ECoG), functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), functional near-infrared
spectroscopy (fNIRS), etc.; (2) signal processing: band-pass filtering,
outlier removal, artifact correction, normalization, etc.; (3) feature
extraction: gain task-relevant information from acquired data; (4)
classification/regression: decode the intended action of the subject
by applying machine learning methods; (5) control commands to
external devices: screen, wheelchair, exoskeleton, etc.; (6) feedback:
the subject receives feedback about how well he/she performed in
a certain training task
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has a major impact on medical decision making, particu-
larly withdrawal of life-sustaining therapies. Indeed,
many prognostication tools (e.g., following cardiac arrest,
intracranial hemorrhage, subarachnoid hemorrhage)
attribute a huge weight on the level of consciousness
(usually crudely assessed by the GCS). From that per-
spective, the use of the most accurate technique to
detect consciousness and capture cognitive motor
dissociation needs to be a major focus of our efforts.
Consciousness is an irreducible component of person-
hood and a central tenet of the Belmont Report [45].
Decisions to withdraw life-sustaining therapies are fre-
quently made within the first weeks following brain in-
jury, frequently within hours or days of the injury.
Increasingly, however, studies show that delayed recov-
ery is more common than previously thought. Con-
sciousness is not systematically quantified to improve
prognostic tools. Concerns relative to these failures of
our moral obligations to probe residual consciousness
and to elaborate a prognosis as precise as possible have
been raised to reduce our ‘neglect’ [46]. In that context,
recent recommendations by an association of British
critical care medical societies to (1) extend the observa-
tion time window; (2) use multiple exploration tech-
niques; and (3) consider the involvement of a
“neuroscience team” are a step in the right direction
[31]. These recommendations should be put to test in
cost-effectiveness studies and undergo open public de-
bate. Caregivers are torn between on the one hand pro-
viding the highest level of care (which includes
providing sufficient time to achieve a reliable prognosis)
and on the other hand to guarantee equity by providing
as many patients as possible access to the scarce re-
source of a highly specialized critical care unit (con-
straints of limited resources). The question of how
much money a given society is willing to invest in order
to maximize chances of recovery should be openly dis-
cussed considering the number of patients that could
benefit from this service. Societal burden of potential
long-term survival with disability also needs to be con-
sidered. To date these considerations are unfortunately
handled locally by caregivers and are at the roots of a
great variability in practice and differences in provided
level of care.
Ethical aspects raised by covert consciousness in the ICU
The potential existence of covert consciousness in unre-
sponsive patients in the ICU raises many concerns. For
example, considering the pain management discussed
above, one might want to preserve any suffering or pain
and administer sedatives and pain killers whenever a
doubt exists [45]. On the other hand, one might want to
preserve covert consciousness in order to maximize the
chances of detection to support prognostication and
possibly provide a communication channel with these
patients in the future. This dilemma has been known for
years by clinicians assessing consciousness using fMRI
of EEG on a regular basis.
Conclusion
Forty-five years ago, Jennet and Plum acknowledged that
the absence of behavioral evidence of awareness could
erroneously suggest the absence of consciousness (“it
seems that there is wakefulness without awareness”),
stating that there is no “reliable alternative available to
the doctor at the bedside, which is where decisions have
to be made” [47]. This visionary prediction is now real-
ity. Given the available data it is clear that behavioral cri-
teria alone are not sufficient to accurately define
consciousness states and it is no wonder that recent dis-
coveries on consciousness disorders have led to revisit-
ing of the taxonomy of patients with disorders of
consciousness [48–50]. For example, recent debate has
emphasized the lack of homogeneity of the minimally
conscious state (minimally conscious state minus/plus
dichotomy [3]) category and even challenged assump-
tions of the nature of consciousness in minimally con-
scious state (proposing to replace this term by cortically
mediated state, to avoid any inference from a patient’s
subjectivity) [50]. Increasing diagnostic precision is
bound to increase prognostic accuracy and will hopefully
lead to tailored therapeutic interventions. The intensivist
needs to stay in tune with this rapidly evolving area that
tackles some of the most complex neuroscientific con-
cepts (i.e., consciousness, neuro-prognosis, neuro-repair),
cutting edge technologies (advanced brain imagery and
signal processing) and fundamental ethical questions
(autonomy, equity, quality of life and life or death
decisions).
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